

## Introduction

# Korea's Soft Power and Public Diplomacy Under Moon Jae-In Administration: A Window of Opportunity

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Toward the end of 2016, a Korean activist friend had posted on his Facebook page that the corruption scandal involving Park Geun-Hye, the then-president of Korea, had undone the efforts for promoting a good image of the country among foreigners, particularly the efforts by him and his NGO. To him and many other Koreans, Park Geun-Hye's involvement in the scandal was a cause for embarrassment. How did the President find himself involved in a close friend's con scheme, which was staged over many years? Moreover, how could the President have contributed to Korea's image as a corrupt country?

Seoul was thus engulfed in political turmoil from the latter half of 2016 to the first half of 2017. It had been revealed that two NGOs run by Choi Soon-Sil, Park's close associate, had laundered money for personal gain. It was also alleged that conglomerates had made huge donations to the NGOs in exchange for political favors from the government. The media and civil society took the issue very seriously; for months, millions of Koreans held candlelight vigils every Saturday. The protests were broadcast all over the world. In December 2016, the Parliament voted to impeach President Park Geun-Hye, and 234 members voted for her impeachment whereas 56 voted against. In March 2017, the Constitutional Court offered a unanimous verdict and upheld the impeachment. The global media interpreted this as the success of a peaceful revolt, praising the non-violent, but effective,

mobilization in Korea (see Delury, 2017; Smith, 2016; *The Economist*, 2017).

Some Koreans are worried that the scandal tarnishes Korea's image in the world's eyes. In contrast, there is an alternative interpretation of the recent events. According to this alternative interpretation, the impeachment demonstrates Korea's intolerance toward corruption, even if it involves political leaders and heads of conglomerates; Korea is a consolidated democracy where the media operates with satisfactory levels of freedom; Korean citizens and civil society organizations are conscious of their democratic rights and employ civil and peaceful means to protect their rights; Korea values freedom of association and that protesters are offered protection to the extent that dissenters can protest in the vicinity of the Blue House; and protesters with opposing views had protested by side without causing violence or necessitating police interference.

In the aftermath of the political crisis, this second interpretation may provide the new administration very important opportunities. This chapter addresses the opportunities available to the new Moon Jae-In administration and offers policy recommendations for the government. In the last part, the chapters in the book are introduced.

## PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER<sup>1</sup>

Joseph Nye, who coined the term "soft power," defines it as "getting others to want the outcomes that you want" (Nye, 2004, p. 5). Nye argues that soft power is based on attraction and persuasion rather than coercion. However, Lee Geun (2009, 2010) argues that soft power is based on soft resources such as ideas, images, symbols, know-how, discourses, culture, and traditions. Lee defines soft power as "the power to construct the preferences and images of self and others through ideational or symbolic resources that lead to behavioral changes of others" (Lee, 2010, p. 116). Lee (2009) argues that the latter definition is analytically clearer and more applicable to non-

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<sup>1</sup> The definitions suggested here are used for the purposes of this chapter only. The views are not necessarily shared by authors of other chapters.

hegemonic countries, unlike Nye's concept, which, as per Lee, focuses on global leadership.

Soft resources are converted into soft power, intentionally or unintentionally, by creating "new ways of thinking, an attractiveness, or a fear in the minds of the recipients in the short-term," which may have long-term effects "when the short-term changes are fixed as 'common sense' or habits" (Lee, 2009, p. 210). However, for soft resources to be converted into soft power, the former should be able to access the marketplace of ideas without being impeded by cultural holes (Pachucki & Breiger, 2010) or a cultural filter (Zaharna, 2010, pp. 102-104). Additionally, the marketplace must also be functional (Kroenig, McAdam, & Weber, 2010).

The term "public diplomacy" has been in use since the 1960s, but it became more common after Joseph Nye coined the term "soft power" in 1990. The former has become even more popular since the 9/11 attacks. Contemporary approaches define public diplomacy as "an instrument used ... to understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values" (Gregory, 2008, p. 276). Public diplomacy is an instrument, not the only instrument, used to generate and utilize soft power (Nye, 2011; see also Hayden, 2012).

## A NEW ERA IN KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Beginning last decade, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has been responsive to calls for restructuring the Ministry to improve the practice of public diplomacy. Officially initiated in 2010 (Ma, Song, & Moore, 2012), evolution of Korea's public diplomacy reflects the recent development in public diplomacy practice and the academic discourses. As a result, two important changes have occurred: (i) better appreciation of the complexity of public diplomacy and (ii) structural reforms within the MOFA.

Until recently, public diplomacy was understood merely in marketing terms, as a means to brand Korea as an attractive country. In fact, creating a positive image of Korea was regarded as the ultimate goal, and the brand

marketing strategy involved one-way communication with the target audience. The Presidential Council on Nation Branding was founded during President Lee Myung-Bak's tenure to accomplish this goal. However, the Council was shut down in less than four years.

The Public Diplomacy Act<sup>2</sup> was passed in 2016, and it reflects the recent discourse in the field, also referred to as "new public diplomacy" (Melissen, 2005; Pamment, 2012). Of late, the complexity of public diplomacy has been acknowledged and appreciated; as a result, its scope has been extended beyond nation-branding. The act also served as the basis for founding the Public Diplomacy Committee. The Committee convened its first meeting on August 10, 2017, a year after the Act came into effect as a result of the impeachment and the ensuing political turmoil. The Committee is led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and comprises representatives from the national and local governments, as well as people from the private sector and the academia. It is too early to evaluate the Committee's work, but a whole-of-government approach to public diplomacy and supplementation from the private and the non-profit sectors were necessary to overcome the lack of coordination and redundancies in Korea's public diplomacy practice (see MOFA, 2017e, p. 5; see also Taehwan Kim, 2012). In this context, the whole-government-approach is capable of integrating public diplomacy into "all aspects of diplomatic practice" without necessarily using the term "public diplomacy" (Pamment, 2016a, p. 239).

The Committee has assigned Korea Foundation (KF) to carry out public diplomacy initiatives (MOFA, 2017d). Under MOFA's leadership and KF's coordination, it is hoped that the Committee "will step up cooperation among central government agencies/between central government agencies and provincial governments, utilize the private sector's public diplomacy capabilities, and increase public awareness and social consensus about public diplomacy" (MOFA, 2017b).

Korea's First Basic Plan on Public Diplomacy (2017–2021) shall serve as a guideline for the Moon Jae-In administration. The plan was implemented in the Committee's first meeting (MOFA, 2017a) and is based on the following vision: "Attractive Korea Communicating with the World

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2 See Ayhan (2016) for an overview of the Public Diplomacy Act.

Together with Citizens” (MOFA, 2017e, p. 11). In addition, it also lists four goals: (i) improving Korea's status and image using rich cultural resources, (ii) disseminating accurate information about Korea, (iii) constructing a friendly and strategically favorable environment for Korea's policies, and (iv) empowering agents of public diplomacy and encouraging collaboration among them (MOFA, 2017e, p. 11). In addition, the following strategies have been identified to achieve these goals: (i) “cultural public diplomacy,” utilizing Korea's cultural resources, (ii) “knowledge public diplomacy,” aiming to amend inaccurate information about Korea and promote Korean studies, (iii) “public diplomacy on policy,” aiming to make Korea's policies more intelligible and accessible to other countries and to the foreign population in Korea, (iv) the “Public Diplomacy Program of Korean Citizens,” which empowers Korean citizens to become citizen public diplomats, and (v) the “public diplomacy infrastructure” to enhance the efficacy of the above strategies (MOFA, 2017e, p. 11).

Furthermore, Park Enna, Korea's Public Diplomacy Ambassador, suggests that “future direction of Korea's public diplomacy” needs to move one step further from addressing only foreign publics through exchange programs, which she calls “public diplomacy 2.0,” and should address also “world citizens” by contributing to global governance goals and the provision of global public goods catching up with the “most evolved” version of public diplomacy, namely “public diplomacy 3.0” (Park, 2017).

In short, public diplomacy is no longer seen as a tool to merely project a positive image of the country to foreigners through one-way branding. Moreover, it is also understood that public diplomacy requires a whole-government-approach; in other words, it has been acknowledged that the MOFA cannot do this alone and the various governmental agencies must have coordination among themselves. Citizens' involvement is also considered crucial for achieving effective public diplomacy outcomes, a significant improvement from the traditional view that regards governmental organizations as the exclusive agents of public diplomacy (MOFA, 2014, 2015, 2016).

Additionally, the developments in Korea's public diplomacy have resulted in structural reforms of the MOFA. Until recently, public diplomacy was managed exclusively by the Cultural Diplomacy Bureau,

although it was the MOFA's "Cultural Diplomacy Manual" that defined cultural diplomacy as "a subordinate concept" of public diplomacy (MOFA, 2010; see also Ayhan, 2014, pp. 135–136). As a result of the recent structural reforms, the following divisions are now responsible for public diplomacy: the Policy-Planning Directorate and the Cultural Diplomacy Bureau. The former is responsible for charting foreign policies and ensuring that the policies are communicated effectively to foreign publics. The latter continues to focus on utilizing Korea's cultural resources to fulfill public diplomacy objectives. More importantly, Korea now has a more empowered Public Diplomacy Ambassador, whose prime responsibility is to oversee public diplomacy policies and activities, and the Ambassador directly reports to the Minister (Ayhan, 2016, pp. 18–19).

## TRANSFORMING THE POLITICAL CRISIS INTO OPPORTUNITIES

As explained above, Korea has, within a very short span of time, ensured that its public diplomacy policies reflect recent trends in the field and academia. What more, then, should the new administration address, especially in the aftermath of the corruption scandal and President Geun-Hye's impeachment? In this section, I attempt to address this question.

First, it is important to consolidate the recent changes in Korea's public diplomacy by pursuing the ends prescribed in the First Basic Plan on Public Diplomacy (2017–2021). The MOFA has brought together various ministries and government agencies, and it is important for the MOFA to coordinate these agencies to ensure that public diplomacy-related activities are connected to Korea's foreign policy goals (see MOFA, 2017e, p. 5). In this context, it is necessary to minimize inter-ministry or inter-agency conflicts in practice. As the Public Diplomacy Committee is led by the MOFA, the latter has the authority to integrate the programs and activities of ministries and agencies involves foreigners in order to fulfill the Committee's public diplomacy goals and, hence the MOFA's foreign policy goals. For example, the Ministry of Justice oversees the Social Integration Program for foreigners who wish to take up residence in Korea or obtain Korean citizenship. However, so far, the program has focused solely on

immigration, and it lacks both a public diplomacy agenda and an interest in foreign policies. Similarly, although the Ministry of Education (MOE) has managed the Global Korea Scholarship since 1967, it has not accommodated public diplomacy objectives. However, effective implementation of the First Basic Plan on Public Diplomacy may ensure that these programs also adopt a public diplomacy perspective. This may also enable the MOFA and the Committee on Public Diplomacy to coordinate these programs.

Second, although public diplomacy is no longer understood to mean only cultural diplomacy, there is still overemphasis on the cultural programs compared to other aspects of public diplomacy listed in the Plan (MOFA, 2017e). This imbalance is due to the lack of conceptual clarity in the discourse about soft power and public diplomacy in Korea (Ayhan, 2017). Often, soft power resources, such as culture, are understood as power; but the mechanism by which resources are converted into soft power is hardly taken into consideration (Lee, 2009). Moreover, soft power is sometimes used interchangeably with public diplomacy and, worse, sometimes as an adjective for it (Ayhan, 2017).

In practice, almost all citizen initiatives supported by the MOFA's "Public Diplomacy Program of Korean Citizens" are cultural exchange programs, mainly aimed at promoting Korean music and food (see MOFA, 2017c). While cultural exchange programs are also important, other intellectual exchanges also should be encouraged and supported. For example, in the US, the State Department's Public Diplomacy Small Grants Program functions differently. The program provides funds to Korean and American civil society organizations for intellectual activities in the fields of Korea-US alliance, transnational or global challenges, and human rights, among other issues (U.S. Embassy Seoul, 2017). This program, given its focus on intellectual activities, connects opinion leaders from Korea with opinion leaders from the US. Such intellectual programs that bring Korean and foreign opinion leaders or youth leaders facilitating mutual understanding and potential future collaboration between them should also be supported and encouraged. Furthermore, the topics of such activities does not need to be about Korea. In line with the spirit of "public diplomacy 3.0" that Ambassador Park describes, the topics could cover global governance goals as well. These network-weaving initiatives based on mutually shared goals

can lead to “international collaborations” which are “sometimes ... the most important form of public diplomacy” (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 22).

The long-term goals of public diplomacy are (i) building relationships and (ii) management based on genuine dialogue (Fitzpatrick, 2007; Gilboa, 2008; Leonard, Stead, & Smewing, 2002; Nye, 2004). These goals should be embedded into all public diplomacy initiatives, including cultural or intellectual exchanges. Mere appreciation of Korean culture or food is inadequate, and in the absence of genuine relationships and dialogue, public diplomacy may not be sustainable. However, the prominence of Korean popular culture, or Hallyu, may be used as a trigger to build and maintain relationships, moving beyond promotional measures.

Similarly, it is important to question other established practices. For example, the Plan calls for a detailed strategy to promote Korean studies at the international level (MOFA, 2017e, pp. 34–35). This entails coordinating the efforts of the MOFA, the MOE, and the Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Sports. However, it is also necessary to consider alternative means to promote Korean studies at the international level. Promoting Korean studies is not only necessary but is also one of the most significant long-term investments the Korean government can make. It is also more valuable than promoting Korean popular culture and food. Emanuel Pastreich (2016), a prominent naturalized foreign scholar in Korea, argues that

Advertising about Korean food and talks at Harvard by Psy are ineffective for raising long-lasting respect for Korean culture and are counterproductive. To suggest that Korea is something fun waiting to be consumed is much less effective than introducing it as a set of values that has stood the test of time and will offer deep insights for those willing to make the effort.

Although it is likely to be more convenient, cheap, and possibly more effective, international education policies, in general, and Global Korea Scholarship in particular, has never been integrated with promotion of Korean Studies. Foreign students find it appealing to study in Korea on government scholarships; the MOE is responsible for ensuring the enrolment of these students and guaranteeing them satisfactory education.

The Ministry of Justice (MJ) ensures that the students get their student visas and, if necessary, limited part-time work permits as well. It is important to include this program and, indeed, other international education and student mobility programs in the public diplomacy equation (see e.g. Byrne & Hall, 2013; Byrne, 2016). The MOFA must also ensure that foreign students' experience of Korea is worthwhile as their own accounts of their experience, word-of-mouth, are both significant and arguably one of the most credible sources for other foreign students (Berger, 2016). Moreover, foreign students speak Korean language and learn about Korea not only in classes but also by living and experiencing the Korean way of life. For these reasons, foreign students in Korea may be best suited to develop expertise in the field of Korean studies.

However, the current international education policies and the scholarship program in Korea do not recognize the significance and potential of foreign students in strengthening Korean Studies worldwide, because it has not been the education-related agencies' job to do so. The Public Diplomacy Committee, however, has declared the promotion of Korean studies a significant public diplomacy goal. Therefore, the Committee must ensure that the investments (or sunk costs?) on foreign students in Korea are tied to goals related to Korean Studies. Additionally, the international student policies pursued by the MOE (or National Institute for International Education Department) and the MJ (or Immigration Office) should be aligned with the Committee's goals regarding the promotion of Korean Studies. After all, Korea is the best place for Korean Studies. Developing and promoting Korean studies in Korea requires little investment and is also highly beneficial. This is not to imply that Korean studies should not be promoted overseas. In fact, promoting this field overseas also has its merits and must be pursued with increasing emphasis.

Third, as mentioned in the first meeting of the Public Diplomacy Committee, it is important to communicate Korea's policies to foreign publics. Two aspects are important in this context: (i) ensuring that Korea's policies are understood and appreciated, or, at the very least, ensuring that they do not draw negative reactions and (ii) presenting Korea's policies as a benchmark to the developing countries, given Korea's status as a non-hegemonic and benign developed country.

Nye (2004) lists three main sources of soft power: culture, political values, and foreign policies. Political values and foreign policies are especially relevant to Korea's recent public diplomacy goal of ensuring an understanding of its policies. It is important for Korea to uphold democratic, liberal, and coherent political values, both at home and abroad, if it seeks credibility and aspires to be a model nation (Nye, 2004). Korea's foreign policies, therefore, should necessarily reflect these political values. Korea would find its credibility and integrity questioned should it pursue policies that are solely pragmatist, opportunist, and driven by self-interest.

The recent political crisis, which led to President Park Geun-Hye's impeachment, has provided Korea a great opportunity to enhance its credentials as a consolidated liberal democracy. The civil society and the media addressed the political crisis in a non-violent and democratic manner. The judiciary, too, steered clear from politics and, in doing so, confirmed that Korea's democratic values are not arbitrary.

Korea has consistently become more significant on the global stage, particularly since it hosted the G20 in 2010. Much like the other middle powers, Korea, too, has found its "niche" (Henrikson, 2005) to make up for its lack of hard resources, which great powers that constitute the G7 and BRICS possess in abundance. Initiatives such as the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth and Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation have accorded Korea importance in the context of global governance (Taekyoon Kim, 2015, p. 3). Korea, with its growing interest and participation in global governance, has situated itself as a middle power mediating between the developed world, mainly represented by the G7, and the developing world, mainly represented by BRICS member states in the G20 platform. It was in this context that the MIKTA partnership was entered into by the middle powers at the G20 summit. The MIKTA partnership involved the coming together of nation-states that were not affiliated with G7 or BRICS (except Saudi Arabia and Argentina). MIKTA is constituted by Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia. I am skeptical about the prospects of MIKTA given the incoherence in political values and interests among the five member states; however, it augurs well that Korea and Australia have been the most assertive and enthusiastic members. The Global Public Diplomacy Network, which is

constituted by public diplomacy organizations from middle power countries, was also a Korean initiative. It aims to strengthen collaboration between the middle powers. Korean policymakers believe that the collective international initiatives of the middle powers, as opposed to individual initiatives, will enable them to acquire a stronger voice in global affairs. Korea's middle power diplomacy is in line with what Nye calls "power with," as opposed to "power over," other actors, and this concept highlights the importance of cooperation to address global or transnational issues in an age of complex interdependence (2011, p. 90).

Korea's political values have not been internationally criticized or challenged much. However, given Korea's growing prominence on the global stage and its responsibilities as a significant stakeholder, more attention will be directed toward Korea's, integrity, conduct, and political values, both at home and abroad. Korea might be required to tradeoff between its short-term interests, such as tied aid or relations with certain authoritarian countries, and long-term interests as a responsible and reliable stakeholder in global governance. Therefore, its public diplomacy policies should be informed by principle-laden political values during the "take-off" stage, rather than attempting to sugarcoat "crash landings" (Kelley, 2009). In other words, Korea's political values must be negotiated, deliberated upon, and legitimated in the public sphere to ensure that the values act as philosophical guidelines (or *Weltanschauung*) for policies in the long-run. This process is also important to ensure the efficacy and integrity of Korea's policies, given their significance as a source of soft power (Habermas, 1989; Schmidt, 2008).<sup>3</sup>

3 The Public Diplomacy Act and the Plan on Public Diplomacy also call for communication with domestic Korean constituents. This is done to ensure they understand the nature of public diplomacy policies and to facilitate their participation. Recently, Moon Jae-in Administration decided to democratize foreign policy and diplomacy by involving citizens in the process even more. This new policy is termed "people-centric diplomacy" (국민외교). Reflecting public opinion on foreign policies and diplomacy as well as domestic policies is a progressive sign. Particularly in terms of public diplomacy, allowing the citizens, as legitimate stakeholders, to participate in policymaking and giving them opportunities to share their opinions and experiences with the policymakers would be very beneficial. This way, the citizens would feel a stronger sense of ownership of public diplomacy policies, and their input might prove valuable for the policies. However, some cautions are in order regarding the new policy of "people-centric diplomacy." First, politicians and public opinion may trade-off long-terms interests for short-term gains. Nicolson suggests

Korea's transformation into a developed economy in a short span of time is highly acknowledged. It is also referred to as the Miracle of the Han River. The Korea International Cooperation Agency promotes Korea's development experiences and offers consultation services and bilateral ODA to developing countries. It does so by making Korea's policies accessible in the marketplace of ideas to policymakers all over the world. That Korea voluntarily translates its policies to make them more accessible to developing countries lends it great credibility. By promoting its policies, Korea also offers viable options for developing countries seeking alternative development policy options. Korea is the first country to graduate from receiving aid to a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Korea's authority in the field of International Development Cooperation stems from its expertise and capabilities (see Avant, Finnemore, & Sell, 2010).

To maintain its credibility and project itself as a responsible and reliable donor country, Korea must address problems in its development cooperation policies. This, too, must be based on the establishment of a *Weltanschauung* in order to avoid the arbitrary practices associated with a pragmatist approach (see also Taekyoon Kim, 2017). It is common for developed donor countries to be faced with the consideration of "a truly developmental perspective versus one shaped principally by diplomatic or commercial imperatives" (Black, Brown, & Heyer, 2016, p. 304; see also Pamment, 2016b). Korea needs to address the discrepancies between "the unremitting ghost of developmentalism" that brings real output expectations from ODA investments and humanitarian assistance (Taekyoon Kim, 2017, p. 2). And insofar as the guiding principles are not arbitrary, Korea can draw further authority in its relations with other actors (see Avant et al., 2010). Korea has made some progress by increasing the ratio of its untied aid from 21% in 2000 to 58% in 2015, but still falling behind OECD DAC's goal of 75%

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disaggregating diplomacy into policy and negotiation and that "diplomatists should seldom be allowed to frame policy. Politicians should seldom be allowed to conduct negotiation. Policy should be subjected to democratic control: the execution of that policy should be left to trained experts" (quoted in Clinton, 2011, p. 29-30). Second, this policy should not be seen as an extension of public diplomacy or vice versa (see e.g. MOFA, 2017f) since the goals are different. Third, the term "people-centric diplomacy" is analytically questionable.

(OECD, 2017).

The corruption crisis of Park Geun-Hye administration, which also included Korea Aid program, offers an important window of opportunity for the new government to pass reforms. And in doing so, the new administration can help elevate Korea's stature as a respectable global leader of development cooperation. Such crises offer golden opportunities to create new common knowledge by undermining "the taken-for-grantedness of these old rules and habits destabilizing the cognitive basis of existing institutions" (Van Ham, 2010, p. 11; see also Culpepper, 2008, p. 5; Haas, 1992, pp. 14-15; Klein, 2007; Young, 1989, p. 371).

It is futile to present Korea as a consolidated democracy in the aftermath of Park Geun-Hye's impeachment. The political climate in Korea is favorable for the implementation of necessary structural changes and long-term strategic plans to substantiate Korea's self-image as a consolidated democracy. Korea, having already achieved economic development and democratization in miraculously short time, possesses the capacity to further develop its public diplomacy and soft power. Korea's public diplomacy policies have been evolving over the last seven years. It has now been recognized that Korea's public diplomacy needs to address global governance-related goals (Park, 2017). These factors also indicate Korea's capacity to further develop its public diplomacy and soft power.

## ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

This book is the product of the 2017 Korea's Diplomacy and Soft Power Conference organized by Hangang Network for Academic and Cultural Exchanges, a Seoul-based NGO, at Ewha Womans' University. All chapters, except introductory chapters, are written by graduate students from diverse backgrounds and different universities. An article contest, to select the ten chapters of the book from the contest's entries, coincided with the Conference. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea (MOFA) sponsored the article contest, the Conference and the book publishing process. The Ewha Womans' University's Institute for International Trade and Cooperation (IITC) generously hosted the conference. Korean

Ambassador for Public Diplomacy Enna Park gave the opening remarks at the conference following her D-Talk (Diplomatic Talk) speech, which is published as the foreword to this book. Professor Nancy Snow, one of the most prominent names in the field of public diplomacy, visited Seoul to give the keynote speech, which is published in this volume. As the editor of this book, I would like to thank the MOFA, Ambassador Enna Park, Ewha IITC, Professor Nancy Snow, Professor Brendan Howe, Professor Jeffrey Robertson, Professor Kim Taehwan, Professor Olga Krasnyak and Hangang Network, and all students who made the Conference and this book possible. In the following paragraphs, I introduce the chapters of this book.

In Chapter 1, David Baker analyzes how South Korea uses international development aid as a tool of its public diplomacy. Baker examines how South Korea's own experience of rapid development has enabled development to become a niche of its middle power diplomacy. The author explains how South Korea combines its foreign aid and development policies with public diplomacy in the following two ways. First, through projects, such as Korea Aid, South Korea uses foreign aid to help enact its public diplomacy initiatives. Second, as South Korea has recently graduated to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development–Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) club, its experience of South–South cooperation allows it to act as a bridge between different paradigms of development within the global development community.

In Chapter 2, Benjamin A. Engel compares the *Saemaul Undong* (SMU) program, which was created under the Park Chung-Hee's administration in the 1970s with the SMU program promoted as a development program overseas by the Park Geun-hye administration. Using the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a research framework, he finds that the current program is trying to supplement the program of the past so as to align it with the current values of development. Such a comparison also highlights that the SMU program of the Park Chung-Hee era had a few drawbacks in a few areas and, while achieving some development goals also operated as a mechanism for the ruling regime to build political support in rural areas.

In Chapter 3, Anaïs Faure examines South Korea's middle power diplomacy and the role of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the

country's foreign policy vision. In particular, the article discusses the way in which middle power diplomacy and ODA were reflected in Korea's relations with Latin American countries between 2008 and 2016. The author argues that Korea has developed a middle power identity of a "bridge country," and has played multiple roles that of a broker, facilitator, and agenda-setter by strengthening its ties with Latin American partners through network diplomacy and implementing ODA as a form of niche diplomacy.

In Chapter 4, Eriks Varpahovskis explores the education channels in Korean soft power strategy towards Uzbekistan. Varpahovskis describes how Korea advances its strategic relations with Uzbekistan by approaching selected Uzbekistan public through the implementation of multi-channeled education projects.

In Chapter 5, Penelope Vandenberghe analyzes how South Korea uses the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics as a part of its nation branding strategy to cultivate new forms of soft power and further build on the already existing soft power. Vandenberghe's chapter also deals with South Korea's efforts to use the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics to initiate dialogue with North Korea.

In Chapter 6, Sarah Kunis explores the potential of using sports as a tool of public diplomacy in the case of relations between North Korea and South Korea. Although the two Koreas remain politically divided, sports have the ability to overcome the limitations that traditional public diplomacy poses and, therefore, can play a unique role in positively influencing public opinion and shaping the relations between the two countries. Kunis' chapter examines the mechanisms of how sports diplomacy influenced inter-Korean relations during the 2004 Athens Olympic Games and the 2014 Incheon Asian Games.

In Chapter 7, Sang Jun Lee examines the co-hosting of the 2002 World Cup as a public diplomacy initiative of Korea. Lee discusses the nexus between sports and public diplomacy, and uses three pillars of public diplomacy, which are credibility, legitimacy, and relationships, to analyze the short- and long-term impacts of the sports mega-event on a public diplomacy perspective. Lee, further, asserts that the mutual, fluid, and flexible nature of sports make it a valuable tool to exercise public diplomacy.

In Chapter 8, inspired by Manuel Castells' highly quoted article (2008), Eduardo Tadeo analyzes the centrality of the non-state actors and the digital sphere in the public diplomacy of Korea. Tadeo examines how the Korean diaspora in the United States conducts its own public diplomacy through digital narratives, to represent itself in the American society, and further express its interests, values and ideas.

In Chapter 9, Seksan Anantasirikiat investigates South Korea's public diplomacy efforts vis-à-vis publics of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Anantasirikiat argues that South Korea has adopted several educational and cultural programs beyond the Korean Wave (Hallyu) to build a positive image and attitudes. These public diplomacy programs have been institutionalized by engaging the international organizations, educational institutes, and the local governments to share their original ideas and responsibilities.

In Chapter 10, Seong Hee Oh examines a case of non-state actors in public diplomacy, focusing on the publication, *Korean Quarterly*. This was founded by a Korean American adoptees' group in Minnesota, the United States. Traditionally, Korean American adoptees group were considered just as a target of public diplomacy. However, the author suggests the group acts as a non-state actor that can express its voice and influence certain events surrounding them.

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